Metacognition and Endorsement

Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307 (2012)
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Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the ‘endorsement problem’: how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement problem
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Vigilance.Sperber, Dan; Clément, Fabrice; Heintz, Christophe; Mascaro, Olivier; Mercier, Hugo; Origgi, Gloria & Wilson, Deirdre
Generative Memory.Michaelian, Kourken
The Evolution of Misbelief.McKay, Ryan T. & Dennett, Daniel C.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions (Focus Section).Arango-Muñoz, Santiago & Michaelian, Kourken

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