Moritz Geiger’s Notion of Dynamic Essence – a Challenge for the Contemporary ‘Platonic’ Conception of Essence?

Abstract

In 1924, the Munich-school phenomenologist Moritz Geiger argued that there are dynamic essences. His two examples are the tragic, and being human, his main ideas are that what it takes to be tragic varies over time historically and that what makes an organism human varies across different stages of its ontogenetic development. He hence points to two ways in which essences may be dynamic, that is, subject to change. The current paper takes Geiger’s view seriously and assumes that it poses an explanatory challenge for the, then and now, standard view that essences are ‘Platonic’, i.e. cannot be subject to change. In the first part of the paper, I introduce Geiger’s view and a bit of its historical context. In the second, I first formulate the challenge it poses to the standard ‘platonic’ view of essence, then discuss how this challenge can be met by a contemporary view of essence discussing three potential responses. The first relies on a notion of relativized essence, the second on the distinction between determinables and determinates, the third and last one on multidimensional properties. Finally, I argue that the last of these three proposals may be preferable to the other two.

Author's Profile

Robert Michels
Universidade de Lisboa

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2024-11-25

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