(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MICSMA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-05-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.
What is Justified Belief.Goldman, Alvin I.

View all 87 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions (Focus Section).Arango-Muñoz, Santiago & Michaelian, Kourken

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-07-31

Total views
208 ( #16,400 of 43,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #15,987 of 43,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.