Misperceiving properties

Mind and Language 38 (2):431-445 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object’s properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions can’t occur; and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling.

Author's Profile

Boyd Millar
Trent University


Added to PP

308 (#37,441)

6 months
108 (#12,835)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?