A Consciência entre o Formalismo e a Psicologia, em Sartre

AdVerbum 3 (2):144-155 (2008)
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Abstract
O presente artigo pretende problematizar, nos três primeiros livros filosóficos de Sartre, a noção de consciência, em torno de um duplo horizonte de interlocução: o legado “formalista” kantiano, e os diversos projetos de “ciência psicológica” existentes nos séculos XIX e XX. Para isso, recompõem-se esses dois horizontes a partir do panorama feito por Sartre desde o momento cartesiano, discutindo as diferentes filosofias da subjetividade e culminando na noção de “intencionalidade”, formulada por Husserl. A noção de consciência intencional serviria como referência para julgar tanto o legado filosófico, quanto para depurar seus prejuízos, entrevistos até mesmo nos contemporâneos de Sartre. ///////////////////////////// This paper intends to discuss, in the three first philosophical books of Sartre, the concept of “conscience”, on two sorts of problems: the kantian legacy, called “formalist”, in one side, and the several projects of “psychological sciences” of XIX and XX ́s centuries. In order to do that, the text retraces the panorama made by Sartre, beginning with the cartesian moment, passing by the theme of “subjectivity”, and culminating with the notion of “intentionality”, on Husserl. The notion of intentional conscience would function as referencial, to judge the philosophical legacy, and even though to purify its defects, seen through the contemporaries of Sartre
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An Introduction to Psychology.Wundt, Wilhelm & Pintner, Rudolf

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