Sanctioning

Jurisprudence 9 (2):236-250 (2018)
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Abstract
Up until recently, most legal philosophers have argued that an action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, (i) its performance brings about unwelcome consequences to the targets, and (ii) it is performed as a response to the breach of a duty. In this paper I take issue with this account. I first add some qualifications to it in order to present it in its most plausible form. After doing this, I advance a series of hypothetical cases which suggests that this account fails. I then propose a new account of sanctioning, whereby an action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, it is performed in an appropriate context and is apt for punishing wrongdoers.
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2017, 2018
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Archival date: 2017-10-13
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Conceptual Ethics I.Burgess, Alexis & Plunkett, David

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2017-10-13

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