Gender, Race & Group Disagreement

In Adam Carter & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. pp. 125-138 (2020)
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This paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers (1) an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and (2), furthermore, diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on the part of the oppressor group.

Author Profiles

Mona Simion
University of Glasgow
Martin Miragoli
University Of Glasgow


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