According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the (...) normativity of action. (shrink)

Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining the difference in a way that keeps it from undermining the knowledge norm. The explanation she offers is in terms (...) of a distinction between doing something that is wrong and doing something that is blameworthy. I respond here by defending the distinction and questioning the explanation she gives of it. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept ‘woman.’ I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—and (...) social kind concepts in general—is not to represent the world, but rather to shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for “conceptual engineering” in philosophy more generally. While Haslanger’s account may escape Simion’s objection, other appeals to conceptual engineering might not fair so well. (shrink)

David Bloor’s thought experiment is taken into consideration to suggest that the rationality of the Other cannot be inferred by way of argument for the reason that it is unavoidably contained as a hidden supposition by any argument engaged in proving it. We are able to understand a different culture only as far as we recognize in it the same kind of rationality that works in our own culture. Another kind of rationality is either impossible, or indiscernible.

the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a (...) work of art is? In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the perceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from indiscernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every perceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) indiscernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like. Our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indiscernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter. (shrink)

In this issue…………….. P.Kesava Kumar: Against Brahminical Tradition: A Dalit Critique of Indian Modernity (4-17) Nirmala V.: Influence of Spandasastra on Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy (18-20) Shruti Rai : Philosophy of Language in Siddhnta aiva Philosophy (21-28) Bhumika Sharma : Relationship Between Dharma and Justice: An Indian Perspective (29-41) Reni Pal: Ahimsa and Satyagraha: Gandhi and the XIV Dalai Lama (42-48) Bhddhiswar Haldar: The Necessity of Gandhian Ethics for Better Future(49-52) Sima Baruah: What Makes Gandhi a Mahatma? (53-59) Jatinder Kumar Jain: Jainism (...) in a Globalised World (60-66) Rinky Chowdhury: Evolution of Varna-srama System into Caste-System (67-69) K.J.Sandhu & Khusboo: Conceptual Framework of Acculturative Stress in relation to Organizational Integration of Employees (70-80) Dinesh Chahal & Nidhi Mehta: Motivation: An Easy Way to Learn (81-86) EMPIRICAL PAPERS Shalini Sisodia & Ira Das: Construction of a Scale for Measuring ‘Egotism’ (Ahamkaar) (87-95) P.K.Mona & Prachi Sharma: Psychological Determinants of Hypothyroidism(96-103) Surila Agrawala & Nidhi Gurbaxani: Quality of Life of Employed and Unemployed Married Women (104-109) NEW PUBLICATIONS (110-111) PHILOSOPHY NEWS IN INDIA (112-114) CONTRIBUTORS OF THIS ISSUE (115-116) Link: http://lokayatajournal.webs.com. (shrink)