Abstract
This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal
for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is
constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy
of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive
identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new
form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world
of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and
the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive
relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the
individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This
paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is
neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on
Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the
self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is
a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction
and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the
social self, becomes its mediator.