The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MITTAO-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-11
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-12-11

Total views
222 ( #25,871 of 2,432,326 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #15,590 of 2,432,326 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.