The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MITTMP
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-05-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-05-07

Total views
130 ( #39,253 of 2,448,587 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
130 ( #4,163 of 2,448,587 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.