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Intuition Mongering
The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are strong arguments just in case there is an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question. Otherwise, appeals to intuition are weak arguments.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2012-09-04
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1,361 (#11,156)
6 months
150 (#24,234)
2012-09-04
Downloads
1,361 (#11,156)
6 months
150 (#24,234)
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