Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer

Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350 (2014)
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Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
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2014
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MIZPCA
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-09-21
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2014-09-21

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