The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407 (2013)
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In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology


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