Aristotle on Vice

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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than the soul of the uncontrolled agent
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Archival date: 2018-10-20
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References found in this work BETA
.Annas, J. (ed.)

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Vice in the Nicomachean Ethics.Nielsen, Karen Margrethe

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