Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu

Mind 122 (485):231-239 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience

Author's Profile

Christopher Mole
University of British Columbia

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-20

Downloads
1,263 (#11,497)

6 months
122 (#38,502)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?