Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics

Economica 73 (290):257-286 (2006)
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Abstract
The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2019-05-08)
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A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.

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