A new puzzle about belief and credence

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291 (2019)
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Abstract

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p. [Word Count: 85]

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Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University

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