A new puzzle about belief and credence

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291 (2019)
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Abstract

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view thatShas a modal belief thatp if and only ifShas a corresponding credence thatp. The second is the view thatSbelieves thatponly ifShas some credence thatp. The third is the view that, possibly,Sbelieves thatpwithout a modal belief thatp. [Word Count: 85]

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Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University

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