Against Rea on Presentism and Fatalism

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:159-166 (2008)
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Abstract

T In [Rea 2006], Michael Rea presents an argument that presentism is incompatible with a libertarian view of human freedom and the unrestricted principle of bivalence. I aim to show that Rea’s argument fails. The outline of my paper is as follows. In Part I, I briefly explain the above three views and I present Rea’sargument. In Part II, I argue that one of the premises of the argument is unjustified.

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Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University

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