Against Rea on Presentism and Fatalism

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Abstract
T In [Rea 2006], Michael Rea presents an argument that presentism is incompatible with a libertarian view of human freedom and the unrestricted principle of bivalence. I aim to show that Rea’s argument fails. The outline of my paper is as follows. In Part I, I briefly explain the above three views and I present Rea’sargument. In Part II, I argue that one of the premises of the argument is unjustified
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Presentism.Crisp, Thomas M.

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