Evidentialism, Time-Slice Mentalism, and Dreamless Sleep

In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance With the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer Verlag (2018)
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I argue that the following theses are both popular among evidentialists but also jointly inconsistent with evidentialism: 1) Time-Slice Mentalism: one’s justificational properties at t are grounded only by one’s mental properties at t; 2) Experience Ultimacy: all ultimate evidence is experiential; and 3) Sleep Justification: we have justified beliefs while we have dreamless, nonexperiential sleep. Although I intend for this paper to be a polemic against evidentialists, it can also be viewed as an opportunity for them to clarify their views. Furthermore, the paper is not only relevant to evidentialists. For example, the arguments of this paper could give Time-Slice Mentalists a reason to deny evidentialism.

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Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University


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