- Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability.Martin Smith - manuscriptdetails
- Prospects for Evidentialism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
- Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles.details
- Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In McCain Kevin, Stapleford Scott & Steup Matthias (eds.), Seemings: New Angles, New Arguments. New York: Routledge. New York: Routledge.details
- A Priori Justification in Nietzsche.Justin Remhof - forthcoming - History of Philosophy Quarterly.details
- Recent Work on Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Understanding and Scientific Progress: Lessons From Epistemology.Nicholas Emmerson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
- Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Paul Silva Jr (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
- Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’.B. J. C. Madison - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):202-214.details
- Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Luis Oliveira & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
- Radical Epistemology, Structural Explanations, and Epistemic Weaponry.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):289-304.details
- Can Worsnip's Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
- The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
- Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.details
- Kantian Fallibilism: Knowledge, Certainty, Doubt.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:99-128.details
- Robust Justification.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
- No Work for a Theory of Epistemic Dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
- Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
- Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:details
- More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
- The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291.details
- Toward a General Theory of Knowledge.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):63-97.details
- Verdad, creencias y fundacionalismo confiabilista.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2020 - Revista de Filosofía 77:51-65.details
- Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):113-124.details
- Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
- L’objectivité scientifique à l’heure de la post-vérité.Laurent Jodoin - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:199-219.details
- Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox.Artūrs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
- Truth, Fallibility, and Justification: New Studies in the Norms of Assertion.John Turri - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-12.details
- Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
- The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
- How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
- Can the Lottery Paradox Be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
- Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
- A Ética da Crença: uma Defesa Moderada da Posição Indiciária.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Sofia 7 (1):17-40.details
- Are Our Moral Responsibility Practices Justified? Wittgenstein, Strawson and Justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’.Benjamin De Mesel - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):603-614.details
- A Theory of Epistemic Supererogation.Han Li - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):349-367.details
- Evidentialism, Time-Slice Mentalism, and Dreamless Sleep.Andrew Moon - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance With the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer Verlag.details
- Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1547-1567.details
- Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
- The Logic of Epistemic Justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
- When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
- The Non-Factive Turn in Epistemology: Some Hypotheses.John Turri - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The factive turn in epistemology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 219-228.details
- Justification as Faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
- Understanding Without Justification or Belief.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):239-254.details
- Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
- Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).details
- Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
- The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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