Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement

Episteme 15 (1):65-79 (2018)
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Abstract
An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God’s existence and one about moral realism.
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MOOIAN-2
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First archival date: 2016-10-06
Latest version: 5 (2016-10-06)
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2016-10-06

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