"Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (2020)
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Abstract
In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
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First archival date: 2019-10-28
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