"The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer (2020)
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Abstract

In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with one another.

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Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen

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