"The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with one another.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORQBO
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-09-02
Latest version: 11 (2020-02-03)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-09-02

Total views
138 ( #31,160 of 54,578 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #25,462 of 54,578 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.