"Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORQR
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-11-12
Latest version: 7 (2019-12-27)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-11-12

Total views
69 ( #38,281 of 50,086 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #28,973 of 50,086 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.