"Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification
In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (2020)
Abstract
In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.
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2019-11-12
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2019-11-12
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101 ( #38,912 of 57,136 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #36,699 of 57,136 )
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