Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99 (1993)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, theories must respect methodological solipsism in the sense that within a theory there cannot be differences in content without a corresponding difference in neural states
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORSAC
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-07-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
115 ( #31,632 of 51,740 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #43,259 of 51,740 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.