Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the role of unworthy epistemic emotions
Philosophical Inquiries (2014)
Abstract
This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.
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2013-12-13
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2013-12-13
Total views
321 ( #23,580 of 69,193 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #45,123 of 69,193 )
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