Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the role of unworthy epistemic emotions

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Abstract
This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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Virtues and Vices in Scientific Practice.Paternotte, Cedric & Ivanova, Milena

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2013-12-13

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