Two puzzles about Thought and Identity in Spinoza

In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics. pp. 56–81 (2017)
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Abstract
I suggest a solution to two puzzles in Spinoza's metaphysics. The first puzzle involves the mind and the idea of the mind, in particular how they can be identical, even though the mind thinks about bodies and nothing else, whereas the idea of the mind thinks about ideas and nothing else. The second puzzle involves the mind and the idea of a thing that belongs to an unknown attribute, in particular how they can be identical, even though the mind thinks about bodies and nothing else, whereas the idea thinks about things belonging to the unknown attribute and nothing else. I suggest that Spinoza would respond to both puzzles by rejecting the Indiscernibility of Identicals.
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