The Relation between Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics

Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17 (2013)
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Abstract
Conception and causation are fundamental notions in Spinoza's metaphysics. I argue against the orthodox view that, due to the causal axiom, if one thing is conceived through another thing, then the second thing causes the first thing. My conclusion forces us to rethink Spinoza's entitlement to some of his core commitments, including the principle of sufficient reason, the parallelism doctrine and the conatus doctrine
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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The Many Faces of Spinoza's Causal Axiom.Martin Lin - 2019 - In Dominik Perler & Sebastian Bender (eds.), Causation and Cognition: Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom.John Morrison - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):40-63.
Spinoza's Formal Mechanism.Martin, Christopher

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