Is Knowledge a Justified Belief?

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 26 (3):175-192 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions.

Author's Profile

Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad
Allameh Tabataba'i University

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-11-22

Downloads
110 (#96,598)

6 months
110 (#46,238)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?