The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142 (2020)
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Abstract

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by Harold Langsam—discuss how more precisely its answer to the challenge would go.

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Hedda Hassel Mørch
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

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