Molinism, Creature-types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication

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Abstract
Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCLs), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to creation, God grasps possible creatures in their individuality. In making my case, I explore the notions of counterfactual implication (that relationship between antecedent and consequent of an SCL which consists in its truth) and counterfactual relevance (that feature of an antecedent in virtue of which it counterfactually implies something or other).
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MURMCA-2
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Archival date: 2018-03-14
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2014-04-23

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