Naïve validity

Synthese:1-23 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Beall and Murzi :143–165, 2013) introduce an object-linguistic predicate for naïve validity, governed by intuitive principles that are inconsistent with the classical structural rules. As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field :1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve validity principles do not admit of a coherent reading and that, for this reason, a non-classical solution to the semantic paradoxes need not be substructural. The aim of this paper is to respond to Field’s objections and to point to a coherent notion of validity which underwrites a coherent reading of Beall and Murzi’s principles: grounded validity. The notion, first introduced by Nicolai and Rossi, is a generalisation of Kripke’s notion of grounded truth, and yields an irreflexive logic. While we do not advocate the adoption of a substructural logic, we take the notion of naïve validity to be a legitimate semantic notion that points to genuine expressive limitations of fully structural revisionary approaches.
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Archival date: 2017-11-30
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References found in this work BETA
Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox.Beall, Jc & Murzi, Julien
Axiomatizing Semantic Theories of Truth?Fischer, Martin; Halbach, Volker; Kriener, Jönne & Stern, Johannes

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2017-09-27

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