Agentive phenomenology

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, we turn to consideration of its nature. We cover questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences (section 2.1), about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience (section 2.2).
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MYLAP
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-07-13
Latest version: 2 (2016-08-22)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-07-13

Total views
308 ( #21,722 of 64,107 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #25,566 of 64,107 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.