Results for 'experience of acting'

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  1.  67
    The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.
    I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and (...)
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  2. Agentive Phenomenology.Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing (...)
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  3. A Philosophical Introduction to the Experience of Time.Sean Enda Power - 2009 - Neuroquantology 7 (1):16-29.
    In this introduction to contemporary conceptions of time and change, I investigate what our experience of time, that is, our experience of change, seems to be and ask whether or not we can say that how it seems could match the reality. My conclusion is that more recent contemporary conceptions of time can do this but that more intuitive or traditional conceptions cannot. Thus, the more contemporary conceptions are preferable for research into time consciousness.
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  4. The Experience of Temporal Passage.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Glasgow
    The project of my dissertation was to advance the metaphysical debate about temporal passage, by relating it to debates about the perceptual experience of time and change. It seems true that we experience temporal passage, even if there is disagreement whether time actually passes, or what temporal passage consists in. This appears to give the defender of dynamic time an advantage in accounting for our experience. I challenge this by arguing that no major account of temporal perception (...)
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  5. Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  6. From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
    When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious (...)
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  7. Could We Experience the Passage of Time?Simon Prosser - 2007 - Ratio 20 (1):75-90.
    This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier (...)
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  8. Religious Experience and the Probability of Theism: Comments on Swinburne.Christoph Jäger - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (3):353-370.
    I discuss Richard Swinburne’s account of religious experience in his probabilistic case for theism. I argue, pace Swinburne, that even if cosmological considerations render theism not too improbable, religious experience does not render it more probable than not.
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  9. On the Temporal Character of Temporal Experience, its Scale Non-Invariance, and its Small Scale Structure.Rick Grush - 2016
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this (...)
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  10. On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
    Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the (...)
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  11. The Geometry of Visual Space and the Nature of Visual Experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.
    Some recently popular accounts of perception account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of the qualities of objects. My concern in this paper is with naturalistic versions of such a phenomenal externalist view. Focusing on visual spatial perception, I argue that naturalistic phenomenal externalism conflicts with a number of scientific facts about the geometrical characteristics of visual spatial experience.
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  12. Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
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  13. The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
    I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.
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  14. The Curious Case of Collective Experience: Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Communal Experience and a Spanish Fire-Walking Ritual.Burns Timothy - 2016 - The Humanistic Psychologist 44 (4):366-380.
    In everyday language, we readily attribute experiences to groups. For example, 1 might say, “Spain celebrated winning the European Cup” or “The uncovering of corruption caused the union to think long and hard about its internal structure.” In each case, the attribution makes sense. However, it is quite difficult to give a nonreductive account of precisely what these statements mean because in each case a mental state is ascribed to a group, and it is not obvious that groups can have (...)
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  15.  75
    The Whence and Whither of Experience.Nick Treanor - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Consider a toothache, or a feeling of intense pleasure, or the sensation you would have if you looked impassively at an expanse of colour. In each case, the experience can easily be thought to fill time by being present throughout a period. This way of thinking of conscious experience is natural enough, but it is in deep conflict with the view that physical processes are ultimately responsible for experience. The problem is that physical processes are related to (...)
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  16.  59
    3. The Expression of Historical Experience.Zoltán Boldizsár Simon - 2015 - History and Theory 54 (2):178-194.
    The theory and philosophy of history (just like philosophy in general) has established a dogmatic dilemma regarding the issue of language and experience: either you have an immediate experience separated from language, or you have language without any experiential basis. In other words, either you have an immediate experience that is and must remain mute and ineffable, or you have language and linguistic conceptualization that precedes experience, provides the condition of possibility of it, and thus, in (...)
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  17.  15
    Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. M. Davies - 1996 - Avebury.
    This book is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...)
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  18. The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. (...)
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  19.  68
    The Bodily Other and Everyday Experience of the Lived Urban World.Oren Bader & Aya Peri Bader - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 3 (2):93-109.
    This article explores the relationship between the bodily presence of other humans in the lived urban world and the experience of everyday architecture. We suggest, from the perspectives of phenomenology and architecture, that being in the company of others changes the way the built environment appears to subjects, and that this enables us to perform simple daily tasks while still attending to the built environment. Our analysis shows that in mundane urban settings attending to the environment involves a unique (...)
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  20. The Lived Experience of Doubling: Simone de Beauvoir's Phenomenology of Old Age.Sarah Clark Miller - 2001 - In Wendy O'Brien & Lester Embree (eds.), The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 127-147.
    This essay demonstrates that Beauvoir's La Vieillesse is a phenomenological study of old age indebted to Husserl's phenomenology of the body. Beauvoir's depiction of the doubling in the lived experience of the elderly--a division between outsiders' awareness of the elderly's decline and the elderly's own inner understanding of old age--serves as a specific illustration of Beauvoir's particular method of description and analysis.
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  21. Authenticity and the Aesthetic Experience of History.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):649-657.
    In this paper, I argue that norms of artistic and aesthetic authenticity that prioritize material origins foreclose on broader opportunities for aesthetic experience: particularly, for the aesthetic experience of history. I focus on Carolyn Korsmeyer’s recent articles in defense of the aesthetic value of genuineness and argue that her rejection of the aesthetic significance of historical value is mistaken. Rather, I argue that recognizing the aesthetic significance of historical value points the way towards rethinking the dominance of the (...)
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  22. Presentism and the Experience of Time.Mauro Dorato - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):265-275.
    Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present (...)
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  23. The Argument for Panpsychism From Experience of Causation.Hedda Hassel Mørch - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
    In recent philosophical literature, panpsychism has been defended by appeal to two main arguments. First, an argument from philosophy of mind, according to which panpsychism is the only view which successfully integrates consciousness into the physical world (Strawson 2006; Chalmers 2015). Second, an argument from categorical properties, according to which panpsychism offers the only positive account of the intrinsic, categorical nature of physical reality (Seager 2006; Adams 2007; Alter and Nagasawa 2012). Historically, however, panpsychism has also been defended by appeal (...)
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  24. The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Experience.Holly Andersen - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target (...)
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  25. Whitehead on the Experience of Causality.Samuel Gomes - 2015 - Process Studies 44 (1):63-82.
    In this article I compare Hume and Whitehead on the experience of causality. I examine Whitehead's examples of such an experience and I offer a defense of Whitehead against Hume on this topic.
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  26.  39
    Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Experience of Technology.David L. Hildebrand - 2018 - In Anders Buch & Theodore Schatzki (eds.), Questions of Practice in Philosophy and Social Theory. New York, NY, USA: pp. 114-135.
    Abstract: For most people, mobile phones and various forms of personal information technology (PIT) have become standard equipment for everyday life. Recent theorists such as Sherry Turkle raise psychological and philosophical questions about the impact of such technologies and practices, but deeper further philosophical work is needed. This paper takes a pragmatic approach to examining the effects of PIT practices upon experience. After reviewing several main issues with technology raised by Communication theorists, the paper looks more deeply at Turkle’s (...)
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  27. The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these (...)
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  28. Problems in the Timing of Conscious Experience.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
    Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.
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  29. Expanding Expertise: Investigating a Musician’s Experience of Music Performance.Andrew Geeves, Doris Mcllwain, John Sutton & Wayne Christensen - 2010 - ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science:106-113.
    Seeking to expand on previous theories, this paper explores the AIR (Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes) approach to expert performance previously outlined by Geeves, Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain (2008). Data gathered from a semi-structured interview investigating the performance experience of Jeremy Kelshaw (JK), a professional musician, is explored. Although JK’s experience of music performance contains inherently uncertain elements, his phenomenological description of an ideal performance is tied to notions of vibe, connection and environment. The dynamic nature of music (...)
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  30. Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2015 - PLoS ONE 10 (8):1-29.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes (...)
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  31. The Poetic Experience of the World.Mathew Abbott - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):493-516.
    In this article I develop Heidegger's phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher's work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language's designative and world-disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein's absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world's existence in (...)
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  32. Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in (...)
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  33. Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory.Natalja Deng - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):713-726.
    Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. (...)
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  34. Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our (...)
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  35. The Body and the Experience of Presence.Joerg Fingerhut - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter. pp. 8--167.
    We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1 – 3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these (...)
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  36.  45
    An Argument for Dualism From the Lived Experience of Time.Steven Merle Duncan - manuscript
    Temporal passage is an irrefragable and ineliminable feature of our lived experience of time. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of whether one adopts a three-dimensional, A theory of time or a four-dimensional, B theory of time, the subject of lived experience of time has to be conceived of as something that stands outside of the physical order in order for the experience of temporal passage to actually occur. This implies the truth of Dualism as the (...)
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  37. The Threshold of Wakefulness, the Experience of Control, and Theory Development.Timothy Lane & Chien-Ming Yang - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1095-1096.
    Reinterpretation of our data concerning sleep onset, motivated by the desire to pay close attention to “intra-individual regularities,” suggests that the experience of control might be a key factor in determining the subjective sense that sleep has begun. This loss of control seems akin to what Frith and others have described as “passivity experiences,” which also occur in schizophrenia. Although clearly sleep onset is not a schizophrenic episode, this similarity might help to explain other features of sleep onset. We (...)
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  38. Kann aus dem Urteil über das Angenehme ein Geschmacksurteil ähnlich wie aus dem Wahrnehmungsurteil ein Erfahrungsurteil werden? (Can a Judgment About the Agreeable Become a Judgment of Taste, As a Judgment of Perception Can Become a Judgment of Experience?).Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 468-476.
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  39. Liberation as the Experience of Pervasive Radiance, the Pervasiveness of Radiance.Rudolph Bauer - 2013 - Transmission 6.
    This paper focuses on liberation as the experience of pervasive radiance.
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  40. One Self: The Logic of Experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.
    Imagine that you and a duplicate of yourself are lying unconscious, next to each other, about to undergo a complete step-by-step exchange of bits of your bodies. It certainly seems that at no stage in this exchange of bits will you have thereby switched places with your duplicate. Yet it also seems that the end-result, with all the bits exchanged, will be essentially that of the two of you having switched places. Where will you awaken? I claim that one and (...)
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  41.  37
    In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons.Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Morten Overgaard (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  42. The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience.Holly Andersen - 2014 - In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press. pp. 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James' development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a (...)
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  43. The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
    Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal (...)
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  44. Remembering with and Without Memory: A Theory of Memory and Aspects of Mind That Enable its Experience.Stan Klein - 2018 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Practice and Research 5:117-130.
    This article builds on ideas presented in Klein (2015a) concerning the importance of a more nuanced, conceptually rigorous approach to the scientific understanding and use of the construct “memory”. I first summarize my model, taking care to situate discussion within the terminological practices of contemporary philosophy of mind. I then elucidate the implications of the model for a particular operation of mind – the manner in which content presented to consciousness realizes its particular phenomenological character (i.e., mode of presentation). Finally, (...)
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  45. Hollows of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):234-288.
    This essay is divided into two parts, deeply intermingled. Part I examines not only the origin of conscious experience but also how it is possible to ask of our own consciousness how it came to be. Part II examines the origin of experience itself, which soon reveals itself as the ontological question of Being. The chief premise of Part I is that symbolic communion and the categorizations of language have enabled human organisms to distinguish between themselves as actually (...)
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  46. How NaÏve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.
    Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views (...)
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  47. The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being.Jason Kawall - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.
    It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is (...)
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  48.  50
    Encountering Finitude: On the Hermeneutic Radicalization of Experience.Jussi M. Backman - 2018 - In Antonio Cimino & Cees Leijenhorst (eds.), Phenomenology and Experience: New Perspectives. Leiden: Brill. pp. 46-62.
    The chapter approaches the hermeneutic concept of experience introduced by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960) from the perspective of the conceptual history of experience in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an overview of the concept and the epistemological function of experience (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) in Aristotle, Francis Bacon, and Hegel, it is shown that the tradition has considered experience first and foremost in methodological terms, that is, as a pathway towards a form of scientific (...)
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  49. Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Andras Szigeti - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
    If you have ever had to move house, you will know this: the worst part is the sofa. You cannot do it alone. Nor will it be enough for me to just lift one end waiting for you to lift the other. We will have to work together to get the job done. If spaces are tight, we will even have to find a practical solution to a tantalizing mathematical puzzle: the moving sofa problem.Joint actions like that are part and (...)
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  50. Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism.Steven Gross, Thitaporn Chaisilprungraung, Elizabeth Kaplan, Jorge Aurelio Menendez & Jonathan Flombaum - 2014 - Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several (...)
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