Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199 (2013)
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Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential value. I argue that existing work on cross-cultural variation in mindreading favors my position over Stich’s.

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Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga


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