Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich

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Abstract
Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential value. I argue that existing work on cross-cultural variation in mindreading favors my position over Stich’s.
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NAGDTE
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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