Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge

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Abstract
Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper argues against the conclusions Gendler draws from empirical work on implicit bias
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Virtue and Reason.McDowell, John

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Remembering as a Mental Action.Arango-Munoz, Santiago & Bermúdez, Juan Pablo
Forms of Luminosity.Khudairi, Hasen

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