Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper argues against the conclusions Gendler draws from empirical work on implicit bias
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NAGIRA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-02-10

Total views
1,404 ( #2,342 of 56,905 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
143 ( #3,689 of 56,905 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.