An experiential account of creativity

In Elliot Samuel Paul & Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), The Philosophy of Creativity. New York: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to argue that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is not a functional/computational, but an experiential one. In other words, what is distinctive about creative mental processes is not the functional/computational mechanism that leads to the emergence of a creative idea, be it the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space, but the way in which this mental process is experienced. The explanatory power of the functional/computational theories and the experiential account is compared and it is pointed out that if creativity is a natural kind, it is not a functional/computational, but an experiential natural kind.

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

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