Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis

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Abstract
According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged.
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NANIRA-7
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Archival date: 2020-01-19
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2009-01-28

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