Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery
Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254 (2010)
Abstract
When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.
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2009-04-27
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971 ( #6,198 of 71,242 )
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80 ( #9,308 of 71,242 )
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