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  1. added 2018-12-10
    Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Avant: Special Issue-Thinking with Images.
    One distinct interest in self-knowledge concerns whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on (...)
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  2. added 2018-01-27
    Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section I identifies relevant philosophical background. II offers a working definition of imagery. III identifies empirical work on visual imagery. IV and V criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to "put the image back into the imagination." The weakened conclusion is (...)
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  3. added 2017-10-27
    THE IMAGINATIVE REHEARSAL MODEL – DEWEY, EMBODIED SIMULATION, AND THE NARRATIVE HYPOTHESIS.Italo Testa - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):105-112.
    In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct (...)
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  4. added 2017-03-11
    Imaginative Vividness.Kind Amy - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):32-50.
    How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-08
    Imagining Experiences.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):561-586.
    It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for (...)
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  6. added 2016-08-29
    " At What Price Freedom?" The Phenomenological Rudiments of Sartre's Cost-Benefit Analysis.Basil Vassilicos - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (1):36-44.
    In this paper, the Sartrean perspective on freedom is situated with respect to the fact that the price of freedom is at issue nowadays like never before. Of particular note is the way recourse is taken to what one might call a ‘commodification’ of freedom. We are not only asked to consider the value of freedom, but to do so in relative terms. In the process, therefore, the questions concerning freedom take on a different guise. On the one hand, what (...)
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  7. added 2016-08-29
    The Time of Images and Images of Time: Lévinas and Sartre.Basil Vassilicos - 2003 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 34 (2):168-183.
    In this paper, Lévinas’s criticisms and reformulations of Sartre’s phenomenology of imagination, in the early text “Reality and its Shadow,” are explored in detail. Levinas's own views on imagination and art are shown to be intimately linked to his critique of Sartrean temporality, insofar as they rely on a renewed phenomenological examination of sensation. As a result, understanding Lévinas’s discussion of the image provides benefits for grasping his notion of the instant and its importance for some of his own positions (...)
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  8. added 2016-06-15
    Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge. pp. 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  9. added 2016-05-14
    Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
    This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...)
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  10. added 2016-05-14
    Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College London
    The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...)
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  11. added 2015-08-14
    Verlust der Welt Im Bild. Ursprung Und Entwicklung des Bildbegriffes Bei Hermann von Helmholtz Und Heinrich Hertz.Gregor Schiemann - 2008 - In G. Wolfschmidt (ed.), Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) and the Development of Communication (Nuncius Hamburgensis. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Band 10). Norderstedt.
    Helmholtz initially ascribes more to theoretical knowledge than merely that it is a picture of the world: it penetrates even to the unobservable causes of the phenomena which he conceived throughout his career as matter set mechanically in motion. The introduction of the picture-concept in the 1860s to characterize scientific theories marks the beginning of the loss of a direct connection with the world. Theories now constitute only a representation of a law-like structure of the world but no longer shed (...)
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  12. added 2015-04-13
    Sartre.Robert Hopkins - forthcoming - In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 82-93.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
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  13. added 2015-02-05
    Self-Knowledge and Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
    How do we know when we have imagined something? How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have? These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge. This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist, outward-looking, and inner sense theories of self-knowledge. A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another person is (...)
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  14. added 2015-01-27
    Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  15. added 2015-01-08
    Icons without turn: Über Bilder und Worte.Andreas Dorschel - 2014 - In Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (ed.), Quo vadis Design? 4 Thesen. pp. 17-37.
    Images, or icons, have been made the subject of a ‘turn’. But no new epoch under its sign is looming. The image is just one medium among others. The best we can do is to face what it may and what it may not achieve. Its main competitor is the word – though there is a field of transition between both. Words and numbers surpass the image when one needs to refer to something that cannot be seen – this holds (...)
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  16. added 2015-01-06
    Literary Narrative and Mental Imagery: A View From Embodied Cognition.Anezka Kuzmicova - 2014 - Style 48 (3):275-293.
    The objective of this article is twofold. In the first part, I discuss two issues central to any theoretical inquiry into mental imagery: embodiment and consciousness. I do so against the backdrop of second-generation cognitive science, more specifically the increasingly popular research framework of embodied cognition, and I consider two caveats attached to its current exploitation in narrative theory. In the second part, I attempt to cast new light on readerly mental imagery by offering a typology of what I propose (...)
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  17. added 2014-08-28
    Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):698-715.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
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  18. added 2014-04-02
    Inadequacies in Current Theories of Imagination.Mostyn W. Jones - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):313-333.
    Interest in imagination dates back to Plato and Aristotle, but full-length works have been devoted to it only relatively recently by Sartre, McKellar, Furlong, Casey, Johnson, Warnock, Brann, and others. Despite their length and variety, however, these current theories take overly narrow views of this complex phenomenon. Their definitions of “imagination” neglect the multiplicity of its meanings and tend to focus narrowly on the power of imaging alone. But imagination in the fullest, most encompassing sense centers instead on creativity, which (...)
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  19. added 2014-03-26
    Imagination in Non-Representational Painting.Andreas Elpidorou - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
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  20. added 2014-03-26
    Imagination and Affective Response.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge. pp. 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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  21. added 2014-03-18
    The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance.Dustin R. Stokes - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
    A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses instead (...)
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  22. added 2014-03-13
    The Roots of Imagination.Mostyn W. Jones - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    This work presents a new theory of imagination which tries to overcome the overly narrow perpectives that current theories take upon this enigmatic, multi-faceted phenomenon. Current theories are narrowly preoccupied with images and imagery. This creates problems in explaining (1) what imagination is, (2) how it works, and (3) what its strengths and limitations are. (1) Ordinary language identifies imagination with both imaging (image-making) and creativity, but most current theories identify imagination narrowly with imaging while neglecting creativity. Yet imaging is (...)
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  23. added 2014-03-07
    Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  24. added 2014-03-05
    Imaginative Attitudes.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):664-686.
    The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining (...)
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  25. added 2014-03-04
    A Puzzle About Visualization.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):145-173.
    Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom. (...)
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  26. added 2014-01-22
    On Choosing What to Imagine.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - In A. Kind & P. Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-84.
    If imagination is subject to the will, in the sense that people choose the content of their own imaginings, how is it that one nevertheless can learn from what one imagines? This chapter argues for a way forward in addressing this perennial puzzle, both with respect to propositional imagination and sensory imagination. Making progress requires looking carefully at the interplay between one’s intentions and various kinds of constraints that may be operative in the generation of imaginings. Lessons are drawn from (...)
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  27. added 2014-01-19
    Outer Vs. Inner Reverberations: Verbal Auditory Imagery and Meaning-Making in Literary Narrative.Anezka Kuzmicova - 2013 - Journal of Literary Theory 7 (1-2):111-134.
    It is generally acknowledged that verbal auditory imagery, the reader's sense of hearing the words on a page, matters in the silent reading of poetry. Verbal auditory imagery (VAI) in the silent reading of narrative prose, on the other hand, is mostly neglected by literary and other theorists. This is a first attempt to provide a systematic theoretical account of the felt qualities and underlying cognitive mechanics of narrative VAI, drawing on convergent evidence from the experimental cognitive sciences, psycholinguistic theory, (...)
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  28. added 2013-12-27
    The Anthropological Function of Pictures.Joerg R. J. Schirra & Klaus Sachs-Hombach - 2013 - In Klaus SachsHombach & Joerg R. J. Schirra (eds.), Origins of Pictures. Anthropological Discourses in Image Science. Halem. pp. 132-159.
    There has been a long tradition of characterizing man as the animal that is capable of propositional language. However, the remarkable ability of using pictures also only belongs to human beings. Both faculties however depend conceptually on the ability to refer to absent situations by means of sign acts called 'context building'. The paper investigates the combined roles of quasi-pictorial sign acts and proto-assertive sign acts in the situation of initial context building, which, in the context of “concept-genetic” considerations, aims (...)
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  29. added 2013-08-27
    The Loss of World in the Image. Origin and Development of the Concept of Image in the Thought of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz.Gregor Schiemann - 1998 - In D. Baird (ed.), Heinrich Hertz. Classical Physicist, Modern Philosopher. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In searching for the origins of current conceptions of science in the history of physics, one encounters a remarkable phenomenon. A typical view today is that theoretical knowledge-claims have only relativized validity. Historically, however, this thesis was supported by proponents of a conception of nature that today is far from typical, a mechanistic conception within which natural phenomena were to be explained by the action of mechanically moved matter. Two of these proponents, Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz, (...)
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  30. added 2013-08-24
    The Imaginative Agent.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2016 - In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (ed.), Knowledge through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 85-109.
    Imagination contributes to human agency in ways that haven't been well understood. I argue here that pathways from imagistic imagining to emotional engagement support three important agential capacities: 1. bodily preparedness for potential events in one's nearby environment; 2. evaluation of potential future action; and 3. empathy-based moral appraisal. Importantly, however, the kind of pathway in question (I-C-E-C: imagining-categorization-emotion-conceptualization) also enables engagement with fiction. So human enchantment with fiction is a consequence of imaginative pathways that make us the kind of (...)
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  31. added 2013-02-12
    Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  32. added 2012-12-08
    Presence in the Reading of Literary Narrative: A Case for Motor Enactment.Anežka Kuzmičová - 2012 - Semiotica 2012 (189):23-48.
    Drawing on research in narrative theory and literary aesthetics, text and discourse processing, phenomenology and the experimental cognitive sciences, this paper outlines an embodied theory of presence in the reading of literary narrative. Contrary to common assumptions, it is argued that there is no straightforward relation between the degree of detail in spatial description on one hand, and the vividness of spatial imagery and presence on the other. It is also argued that presence arises from a first-person, enactive process of (...)
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  33. added 2011-12-15
    Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and (...)
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  34. added 2010-04-20
    Recollection, Perception, Imagination.Alex Byrne - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148:15 - 26.
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. The paper addresses two questions: Q1. What are these similarities (and differences)? Q2. How does one tell that one is recalling (and so not perceiving or imagining)?
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  35. added 2010-02-26
    The Multidimensional Spectrum of Imagination: Images, Dreams, Hallucinations, and Active, Imaginative Perception.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2014 - Humanities 3 (2):132-184.
    A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he (...)
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  36. added 2010-02-26
    Imagination.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.
    A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination.
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