An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox

Ethics 129 (2):309-343 (2019)
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I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence.
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First archival date: 2017-12-02
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