The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than

Noûs 52 (4):874-899 (2018)
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The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments.
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First archival date: 2016-12-18
Latest version: 5 (2018-11-11)
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