Two paradigms for religious representation: The physicist and the playground

Cognition 164:206-211 (2017)
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Abstract
In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. I conclude by suggesting some approaches to empirically testing our views.
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2017
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Archival date: 2017-03-31
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The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.
Introduction to the Special Issue: What Are Religious Beliefs?Coleman Iii, Thomas J.; Jong, Jonathan & van Mulukom, Valerie

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