Results for 'factual belief'

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  1. The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.
    This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large backgrounds of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious (...)
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  2. Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):698-715.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. (...)
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  3. (Counter)Factual Want Ascriptions and Conditional Belief.Thomas Grano & Milo Phillips-Brown -
    What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to a highly influential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the ~p worlds. This approach faces a well-known and as-yet unsolved problem, however: it makes the entirely wrong predictions with what we call '(counter)factual want ascriptions', wherein the agent either (...)
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  4. The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume I. Oxford University Press.
    Because we must often make decisions in light of imperfect information about our prospective actions, the standard principles of objective obligation must be supplemented with principles of subjective obligation (which evaluate actions in light of what the agent believes about their circumstances and consequences). The point of principles of subjective obligation is to guide agents in making decisions. But should these principles be stated in terms of what the agent actually believes or what it would be reasonable for her to (...)
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  5. Believing Without Evidence: Pragmatic Arguments for Religious Belief in Life of Pi.Alberto Oya - 2020 - In Adam T. Bogard (ed.), Critical Insights: Life of Pi. New Jersey, USA: pp. 136-147.
    The aim of this essay is to show that Yann Martel’s Life of Pi can be read as illustrating what philosophers usually name as pragmatic arguments for religious belief. Ultimately, this seems to be the reason why, in the short prologue that accompanies the novel, Martel claims Life of Pi to be “a story to make you believe in God”. To put it briefly, these arguments claim that even conceding that the question of whether to believe that God exists (...)
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  6. Truth and Longing: An Inquiry Into the Epistemology of "Belief".Richard Oxenberg - manuscript
    William Alston has written that religious belief is justifiable because it is based upon epistemic practices similar to those justifying belief in sensory facts. In this paper I argue for a different understanding of religious belief. What is called for in religious belief is not affirmation of factual truth-claims but devotion to God. The significance and validity of creedal formulae lie in their capacity to elicit and express such devotion, not in their factual and/or (...)
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  7. The Ethics of Inquiry, Scientific Belief, and Public Discourse.Lawrence Torcello - 2011 - Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (3):197-215.
    The scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change is firmly established yet climate change denialism, a species of what I call pseudoskepticism, is on the rise in industrial nations most responsible for climate change. Such denialism suggests the need for a robust ethics of inquiry and public discourse. In this paper I argue: (1) that ethical obligations of inquiry extend to every voting citizen insofar as citizens are bound together as a political body. (2) It is morally condemnable for public officials (...)
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  8. Una proposta per la caratterizzazione della credenza religiosa.Daniele Bertini - 2014 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 16.
    My paper challenges the externalist mainstream assumptions towards the understanding of religious beliefs (i.e., reliabilism by W.Alston, the warrant belief approach by A.Plantinga, the neowittgensteinian analysis of doxastic systems). According to such assumptions, religious beliefs should be evaluated rational in terms of the same doxastic standard giving justification for ordinary factual beliefs. Moving from the empiricist intuition that the kind of content of belief matters to the form of belief and the justification practices for it, I (...)
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  9. Does "Think" Mean the Same Thing as "Believe"? Linguistic Insights Into Religious Cognition.Larisa Heiphetz, Casey Landers & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13 (3):287-297.
    When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...)
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  10. Two Paradigms for Religious Representation: The Physicist and the Playground.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2017 - Cognition 164 (C):206-211.
    In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his (...)
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  11. Beyond Fakers and Fanatics: A Reply to Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-6.
    Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne have written a piece, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, called “Disbelief in Belief,” in which they criticize my recent paper “Religious credence is not factual belief” (2014, Cognition 133). Here I respond to their criticisms, the thrust of which is that we shouldn’t distinguish religious credence from factual belief, contrary to what I say. I respond that their picture of religious psychology undermines our ability to distinguish common religious people from fanatics. (...)
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  12. To Believe is Not to Think: A Cross-Cultural Finding.Neil Van Leeuwen, Kara Weisman & Tanya Luhrmann - 2021 - Open Mind 5:91-99.
    Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the US, Ghana, (...)
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  13. Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of delusions, (...)
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  14. Moral Discourse Boosts Confidence in Moral Judgments.Nora Heinzelmann, Benedikt Höltgen & Viet Tran - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34.
    The so-called “conciliatory” norm in epistemology and meta-ethics requires that an agent, upon encountering peer disagreement with her judgment, lower her confidence about that judgment. But whether agents actually abide by this norm is unclear. Although confidence is excessively researched in the empirical sciences, possible effects of disagreement on confidence have been understudied. Here, we target this lacuna, reporting a study that measured confidence about moral beliefs before and after exposure to moral discourse about a controversial issue. Our findings indicate (...)
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  15. Propaganda, Misinformation, and the Epistemic Value of Democracy.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 30 (3-4):194-218.
    If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.
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  16. How to Be a Normative Expressivist.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
    Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does (...)
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  17. Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabiab Dorsch - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical (...)
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  18. Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. (...)
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  19. Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea.Lucinda Vandervort - 1987-1988 - Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2 (2):233-309.
    In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather than (...)
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  20. Tradizioni religiose e diversità.Daniele Bertini - 2016 - Edizioni Fondazione Centro Studi Campostrini.
    Most literature on religious beliefs and disagreements among traditions focuses on a bit of mainstream assumptions: religions should be construed in substantive terms; religions are to be individuated by their core belief systems; adherents to a single tradition assent to the same belief system; religious beliefs have factual content; incompatible religious beliefs cannot be both true; and so on. In my work I question all these claims in order to defend a non kantian approach to deep pluralism. (...)
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  21. Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry.Claire Field - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):391-413.
    Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between (...)
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  22. The Blind Shadows of Narcissus - a Psychosocial Study on Collective Imaginary.Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à vista.
    In this work, we will approach some of the essential questions about the collective imaginary and their relations with reality and truth. We should face this subject in a conceptual framework, followed by the corresponding factual analysis of demonstrable behavioral realities. We will adopt not only the methodology, but mostly the tenets and propositions of the analytic philosophy, which for sure will be apparent throughout the study, and may be identified by the features described by Perez : Rabossi (1975) (...)
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  23. Narrating the Truth (More or Less).Stacie Friend - 2006 - In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and Epistemology. Dordrecht, Netherlands: pp. 35-50.
    While aestheticians have devoted substantial attention to the possibility of acquiring knowledge from fiction, little of this attention has been directed at the acquisition of factual information. The neglect traces, I believe, to the assumption that the task of aesthetics is to explain the special cognitive value of fiction. While the value of many works of nonfiction may be measured, in part, by their ability to transmit information, most works of fiction do not have this aim, and so many (...)
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  24. Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide - Edited by John K. Roth. [REVIEW]Aleksandar Jokic - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (1):94-96.
    Having followed the literature on genocide since the beginning of 1990s I have been often struck that academic writing on genocide is very much like non-professional pursuits in youth sports: anything is considered 'a good try'. The French have a good phrase for what I mean here: n'importe quoi. Works exhibiting no sound methodology, replete with irrational claims without factual basis and beliefs about foreigners adopted on faith limited only by a 'the worse the better' criterion of plausibility dominate (...)
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  25. The Island Has Its Reasons: Moral Subjectivism in Fiction.Kasandra Barker - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):121-124.
    Tamar Gendler takes on “explaining our comparative difficulty in imagining fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (56), otherwise known as the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Generally speaking, readers have no trouble believing untrue factual claims such as in Alice in Wonderland or The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, but we resist claims which advocate praise or approval of immoral acts such as murder. Gendler submits that the implied author aims to persuade the reader to change his or (...)
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  26.  22
    Grenzen für den Utilitarismus. Ein transzendentales Gegenargument.Olaf L. Müller - 2002 - In Wolfram Hogrebe (ed.), Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen. XIX. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie - Sektionsbeiträge. Bonn, Deutschland: Sinclair Press. pp. 107-115.
    Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do (even when she speaks). If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: (...)
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  27.  17
    The Trade Between Fiction and Reality: Smuggling Across Imagination and the World.Wolfgang Huemer, Daniele Molinari & Valentina Petrolini - forthcoming - Discipline Filosofiche.
    The current debate on literary cognitivism in the philosophy of fiction typically assumes that we can rigorously distinguish between fictional and factual, and focuses on the question of whether and how works of fiction can impart propositional knowledge to the reader. In this paper we suggest that this way of framing the debate may be problematic. We argue that works of fiction almost inevitably include a reference to the real world and that – contrary to what is usually assumed (...)
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  28.  50
    A Pre-Formal Proof of Why No Planar Map Needs More Than Four Colours.Bhupinder Singh Anand - manuscript
    Although the Four Colour Theorem is passe, we give an elementary pre-formal proof that transparently illustrates why four colours suffice to chromatically differentiate any set of contiguous, simply connected and bounded, planar spaces; by showing that there is no minimal 4-coloured planar map M. We note that such a pre-formal proof of the Four Colour Theorem highlights the significance of differentiating between: (a) Plato's knowledge as justified true belief, which seeks a formal proof in a first-order mathematical language in (...)
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  29. Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument'.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 128-142.
    This is a commentary on Adrian Heathcote’s interesting paper ‘Hume’s Master Argument’. Heathcote contends that No-Ought-From-Is is primarily a logical thesis, a ban on Is/Ought inferences which Hume derives from the logic of Ockham. NOFI is thus a variation on what Heathcote calls ‘Hume’s Master Argument’, which he also deploys to prove that conclusions about the future (and therefore a-temporal generalizations) cannot be derived by reason from premises about the past, and that conclusions about external objects or other minds cannot (...)
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  30. When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-81.
    Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they (...)
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  31.  58
    On Aristotelian Ἐπιστήμη as ‘Understanding’.J. Lesher - 2001 - Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):45-55.
    Myles Burnyeat maintains that Aristotelian epistêmê, in so far as it deals with explanations, is properly identified as understanding rather than as knowledge. Although Burnyeat is right in thinking that the cognitive achievement Aristotle typically has in mind is not justified true belief, Aristotelian epistêmê cannot be equated with understanding. On some occasions in Aristotle's writings (e.g. Apo 71a4), the term designates a particular science such as mathematics; on others (e.g. Apo 72b18-20), it designates the grasp of a first (...)
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  32. What We Talk About When We Talk About Mental States.Zoe Drayson - 2022 - In Tamas Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. Routledge. pp. 147-159.
    Fictionalists propose that some apparently fact-stating discourses do not aim to convey factual information about the world, but rather allow us to engage in a fiction or pretense without incurring ontological commitments. Some philosophers have suggested that using mathematical, modal, or moral discourse, for example, need not commit us to the existence of mathematical objects, possible worlds, or moral facts. The mental fictionalist applies this reasoning to our mental discourse, suggesting that we can use ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ talk (...)
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  33. Radicalization and Fem's Rights.Louise Goueffic - manuscript
    Paper 18 Defines patriarchal radicalization, imprinted on the mind to change it from being a thinking organ to being a belief-organ. I claim that rights to correct information and factual names about the speech-making species can only be sapient rights.
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  34.  17
    Pessimism and optimism in crisis.Milanko Govedarica - 2021 - In Nenad Cekić (ed.), Етика и истина у доба кризе. Belgrade: University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy. pp. 83-96.
    The subjective dimension of the crisis is considered, i.e. the influence of pessimistic and optimistic attitude on the outcome of the crisis. The thesis is that it is not justified to reduce subjectivity to arbitrariness, because the subject is correlated with objective facts, with other subjects and supersubjectivity (absolute reality). It turns out that the evaluation of factual truths is of central importance in the subject’s relationship to his own crisis situation. The author explains that delusional evaluation beliefs have (...)
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  35. Hume Is Not A Skeptic About Induction.Xinli Wang - 2001 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 36 (78):41-54.
    On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.
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  36. The Mental and the Normative: A Non-Psychological Account.Maurilio Lovatti - manuscript
    (draft; call for comments) The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending and surely they are an irremovable element in constitutive aims of believing or intending. Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative (this claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative). The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of the intentional states of the human mind. (...)
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  37. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):866-868.
    Suppose you and I are equally well informed on some factual issue and equally competent in forming beliefs on the basis of the information we possess. Having evaluated this information, each of us independently forms a belief on the issue. However, since neither of us is infallible, we may end up with contrary beliefs. How should I react if I discover that we disagree in this way? According to conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, I should modify (...)
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  38. Tempered Expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (1).
    The basic idea of expressivism is that for some sentences ‘P’, believing that P is not just a matter of having an ordinary descriptive belief. This is a way of capturing the idea that the meaning of some sentences either exceeds their factual/descriptive content or doesn’t consist in any particular factual/descriptive content at all, even in context. The paradigmatic application for expressivism is within metaethics, and holds that believing that stealing is wrong involves having some kind of (...)
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  39.  95
    A Sociological Study on the Origin of the Act of Sin -The Case of Adam's Story-.Coşkun Dikbıyık - 2018 - Tasavvur - Tekirdag Theology Journal 4 (2):506 - 538.
    This study is a theoretical work in the field of sociology of religion which aims to explain the origin of the act of sin and the fundamental motives of crime and deviation tendencies in this context, from Adam’s story in the Qur'an, the main source of Islam. Sin is regarded as a negative act in religious-cultural sense where one struggles for life and tries to protect itself. Though a direct correlation cannot be established with belief values, the sense of (...)
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  40. The Real Conflict Between Science and Religion: Alvin Plantinga’s Ignoratio Elenchi.Herman Philipse - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):87--110.
    By focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule of scientific method and of common sense, according to which factual claims should be endorsed as true only if they result from validated epistemic methods or sources.
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  41. Polarization and Belief Dynamics in the Black and White Communities: An Agent-Based Network Model From the Data.Patrick Grim, Stephen B. Thomas, Stephen Fisher, Christopher Reade, Daniel J. Singer, Mary A. Garza, Craig S. Fryer & Jamie Chatman - 2012 - In Christoph Adami, David M. Bryson, Charles Offria & Robert T. Pennock (eds.), Artificial Life 13. MIT Press.
    Public health care interventions—regarding vaccination, obesity, and HIV, for example—standardly take the form of information dissemination across a community. But information networks can vary importantly between different ethnic communities, as can levels of trust in information from different sources. We use data from the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health Survey to construct models of information networks for White and Black communities--models which reflect the degree of information contact between individuals, with degrees of trust in information from various sources correlated with (...)
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  42.  73
    College Factual Doctoral. [REVIEW]Kiyoung Kim - manuscript
    The major research universities in the United States had been investigated for the doctoral ranking of 2022 College Factual. The investigation had been performed as best as possible for the accuracy of data, but never be perfect nor exhaustive about the search terms. Suggestion and advice are truly welcome (Kiyoung Kim, Professor of Law and Public Policy, College of Law and Social Studies, Chosun University, Gwang-ju, South Korea). I plan that the data would be used for the next research (...)
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  43.  36
    College Factual Doctorate. [REVIEW]Kiyoung Kim - manuscript
    The major research universities in the United States had been investigated for the doctoral ranking of 2022 College Factual. The investigation had been performed as best as possible for the accuracy of data, but never be perfect nor exhaustive. Suggestion and advice are truly welcome (Kiyoung Kim, Professor of Law and Public Policy, College of Law and Social Studies, Chosun University, Gwang-ju, South Korea. I plan that the data would be used for the next research publication. The institutions had (...)
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  44. True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development.Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children?s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children?s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks are (...)
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  45. Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons.André J. Abath - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (2):543-571.
    John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at all. But we (...)
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  46.  90
    Moral and Factual Ignorance: A Quality of Will Parity.Anna Hartford - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1087-1102.
    Within debates concerning responsibility for ignorance the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is often treated as crucial. Many prominent accounts hold that while factual ignorance routinely exculpates, moral ignorance never does so. The view that there is an in-principle distinction between moral and factual ignorance has been referred to as the “Asymmetry Thesis.” This view stands in opposition to the “Parity Thesis,” which holds that moral and factual ignorance are in-principle similar. The Parity Thesis has (...)
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  47.  20
    Group Belief: Summativism in Non-Summativist Cases.Youssef Aguisoul - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (3):231-243.
    The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While (...)
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  48. Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Belief is a familiar attitude: taking something to be the case or regarding it as true. But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. For this reason, many epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence, similar to a degree of confidence. This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. beliefs about (...)
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  49. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that (...)
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  50. Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of (...) change to model how they function, and that this gives Perry’s (1977) two tier account the advantage over Lewis’s (1979) theory -/- . (shrink)
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