Abstract

De Proost & Grey criticize Nickel et al.’s article “Justice and empowerment through digital health: ethical challenges and opportunities,” arguing that it should have embraced relational autonomy and capability approaches. We distinguish two variants of this critique, one saying that a view of digital health empowerment should welcome these approaches, and one saying that a view of digital health empowerment should essentially be defined in terms of these approaches. We are somewhat open to the first variant: relational autonomy and the capability approach are promising ways of spelling out the ethical values behind digital health empowerment, even if they are not completely unproblematic and uncontroversial. However, there are reasons to reject the second variant. A view that leaves the exact normative commitments of digital health empowerment open is persuasive to a wider audience, and more amenable to different constructs of autonomy, capability, and empowerment across disciplines.