Truthmakers and Predication

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 4:171-192 (2008)
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To what extent do true predications correspond to truthmakers in virtue of which those predications are true? One sort of predicate which is often thought to not be susceptible to an ontological treatment is a predicate for instantiation, or some corresponding predication (trope-similarity or set-membership, for example). This paper discusses this question, and argues that an "ontological" approach is possible here too: where this ontological approach goes beyond merely finding a truthmaker for claims about instantiation. Along the way a version of the problem of the regress of instantiation is posed and solved.

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Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame


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