Against Fragmentation

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Abstract
I criticize the idea that theories of ‘fragmented’ or ‘compartmentalized’ belief (as found in, e.g., Lewis 1982, Egan 2008) can help to account for the puzzling phenomena they are often taken to account for. After introducing fragmentationalism and a paradigm case that purportedly motivates it, I criticize the view primarily on the grounds that the models and explanations it offers are at best trivial—as witnessed by examples of over-generation—and should be seen as merely re-describing in figurative terms the phenomena it is designed to account for. I also point out that fragments, as used in these theories, are not likely to be psychologically real in any robust sense and so cannot be appealed to on such grounds
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Common Ground.Stalnaker, Robert
A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing.Collins, Allan M. & Loftus, Elizabeth F.

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2014-03-11

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