A questão do livre-arbítrio em John R. Searle: uma contraposição do naturalismo biológico ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo

Cognitio-Estudos 12 (2):179-190 (2015)
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This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism – particularly the computacionalist line – with the biological naturalism of John Searle regarding the possibility of free will. In such contrast, each line is decomposed into its statements so that they can be reviewed. It is argued that the searlean biological naturalism can explain more than the other two philosophies on how free action can have the source of its motivation in what is external to the mental state that makes it beperformed. Finally, even if the issue of free will still is open, I shall argue that free will does not find any room in the scenario that the lines of physicalism and functionalism present.
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