The parallelism argument and the problem of moral luck

Philosophical Studies 179 (3):955-971 (2021)
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Robert Hartman’s parallelism argument aims to show that resultant moral luck exists. The gist of the argument is this: because there is circumstantial moral luck in a particular circumstantial luck scenario and that scenario is analogous in important ways to a particular resultant luck scenario, the resultant luck scenario is plausibly an instance of resultant moral luck. I argue that there is a principled way of denying that circumstantial moral luck is present in the circumstantial luck scenario. Doing so is not enough, however, to reject Hartman’s general analogical line of reasoning since an alternative parallelism argument based on a resultant luck scenario and a circumstantial luck scenario of another kind can be made. Nevertheless, I argue that the analogy between the circumstantial luck scenario and the resultant luck scenario in both the alternative parallelism argument and its original counterpart is too weak to support the claim that resultant moral luck is present in the resultant luck scenario.
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Archival date: 2021-08-18
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